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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GEORGE X. ~-\NDERSON and
wife, L\IOGENE T. ~-\NDERSON,
LOREXZO \Y. ~-\XDERSON. heretofore known a:::; LORENZO W.
AXDERSOX. JR., and wife HAZEL :JI. AXDERSOX.
plaintiffs and appellants,

vs.
j!ARIE T. JOHNSON and
CHESTER X. JOHNSON,
defendants and respondents

APELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Lorenzo ,V. Anderson, now deceased, was a resident
of Brigham City, Box Elder County and was engaged
most of his life in Civil Engineering. On the side, he
forn1erl~· did some abstracting and conveyancing.
He
was t lit> owner of the tracts of land described on page
9 of the files. It appears from the evidence that it was
his de~ire to divide his property in his lifetime mnong
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his children rather than subject the same to probate.
Oeorge N. Anderson, Lorenzo W. Anderson, the plaintiffs and appellants, and Marie T. Johnson, defendant
and respondent, are all of the surviving children of the
senior Anderson. To distinguish between the deceased
and his son, Lorenzo, I will refer herein to the surviving son as Ren and the senior Anderson, deceased, as
•'deceased' '.

'l,he only property with which we are concerned in
this appeal consists of Tract No. 2 which will be referred
to as the Garland property and the tract described in
paragraph 9 (c) (tr. 9) which I will refer to as the
Promontory property.
The deceased, in furtherance of his desire to divide
his property before death, made two sets of deeds with
which this appeal is concerned. In March of 1943, he
caused to be drawn a warranty deed to Ren which purported to convey to Ren the Garland tract and a 1/3
undivided interest in the Promontory tract. Having
made sorne previous conveyances to his daughter, Marie,
and his son, George, he then drew other deeds granting
a undivided 1./3 interest in the Promontory property
to each George and Marie. The question of the delivery
of these 1943 deeds is the focal point of this case
because in 1949 an additional set of deeds were drawn
by the deceased in which all of the Promontory property
was conveyed to his daughter, Marie and her husband.
George Anderson was eliminated from any ownership
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in the Pron10ntory trart as was also Ren and a IWW dtwd
drawn in Ren'~ favor conveying to hhn the ~ame Oarland tract.
rrhe E)-!3 deeds were never reeorded but all parties
agreed in Court that they were Pxecutd as pleaded ( tr.
182). The 1943 deeds were destroyed by Marie in 1949
(tr. 126). None of the appellants knew or were advised of the so-called destruction of the 1943 deeds until
they can1e to Utah for their father's funeral. Marie,
however, claims to have had her 1949 deed delivered to
her by the deceased and she recorded her deed the day
before her Father died (tr. 127). Marie testified rather
fully as to the delivery of the 1949 deeds but was prevented from testifying as to the delivery of the 1943
deeds (tr. 119). Marie and Chester Johnson were called
to testify as adverse parties by the appellants (tr. 117).
The plaintiffs were called to testify as grantees and all
were excluded from testifying as to transactions with
deceased upon objection made by the attorney for the
respondents. ( tr. 183)
The appellants offered to prove by Marie Johnson
the fact of the execution and delivery of the 1943 deeds
and this offer as well as other testimony relating to
all parties was excluded by the Court under the provisions of Section 104-49-2, (3), UCA, 1943, which will be
referred to hereafter as the dead man's statute. (tr.
104) It is felt that this statement will be agreed to
by opposing counsel so that continued repetition of the
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l'ads and citations from the transcrip are unnecessary.
rl,he { ~ourt stated the substance of its rulings as appears
on page 11 G of the transcript as follows:
"As to the '43 deeds, apparenty we understand
there are two or three deeds made in 1943. The
defendant, as an heir of Lorenzo Anderson, asserts
this statute as to these '43 deeds and the Court is going
to sustain the objection as to these conversations or
any transaction which was equally within the knowledge
of the witness, who is a party, and the deceased so the
objection is sustained.''
now

George Anderson is a resident of the State of
Idaho and Ren is a resident of the State of California
and during the last few years of the deceased's life,
he lived with Marie in Brigham City and the appellants
claim that the only way that proof of execution and
delivery of the 1943 deeds was by cross examination
of the respondents and examination of the appellants
as to transactions had with their father. The same
objection was sustained as to Chester Johnson even
though he is not an heir of the deceased (tr. 188).
Similar rulings of the Court as to other witnesses appear
on tr. 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 116, 117, and other places
in the record so numerous as to make an unwarranted
length of this statement of facts. The Court ruled
that if an objection was raised by a grantee, the objection should be overruled but if it was raised by an
heir, it should be sustained. (tr. 107)
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The appellants 1naintain thn t the uwt hod t lu• dt>eeased used in nmking the deeds of 1!l-t-:~ and tho~w of

1949 were the same and that therefore, it' thPrP wa~ a
deliYery of the UJ4~) deeds. there also wa~ a delivery
of the 1943 deeds, the earlier date being at a time when
all parties agree that the deceased was in good n1ental
and physical condition and that excluding transactions
with the deceased pertaining to the 1943 deeds and
to permit sin1ilar transactions with the deceased of
the 19-19 deeds was prejudicial. ( tr. 321, beginning at
line 2). Futhennore, between the dates of the two sets
of deeds, the deceased had made a will sometime during
th year of 19-17, (tr. 249) the terms of which wer.e entirely inconsistent with the execution of the 1943 deeds
as well as those of 1949.
vVhile there are a great 1nany more facts of interest,
it is thought that the foregoing is sufficient to inforn1
the Court of the prejudicial error committed by the
Court sufficient to grant a new trial.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
BY THE APPELLANTS
That the Court erred in the following respects:

FIRST: In its ruling that the provisions of Section
104-49-2 sub-section 3, U CA 1943, commonly known as
the "dead man's statute", applied to make incompetent
to testify in this case either or any of the defendants and
the plaintiffs.
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SECOND: In sustaining defendants' objections as

to any conversations that any of the plaintiffs claimed
to have had with the deceased Lorenzo W. Anderson.
THIRD: In its holding that one of the defendants,
~~ arie

'l'. Johnson, called by the plaintiff on cross ex-

amination, was incompetent to testify as to any statement by, or transaction with, such deceased, or matter
of fact whatever, which must have been equally within
the knowledge of both the witness and such deceased
person, by reason of the provisions of said ''dead man's
statute."
FOURTH: In its holding that one of the defendants
Chester N. Johnson, called by the plaintiff on cross examination, was incompetent to testify as to any statement by, or transaction with, such deceased, or matter
of fact whatever, which must have been equally within
the knowledge of both the witness and such deceased
person, by reason of the provisions of said "dead man's
statute.''

FIFTH: In its holding that one of the plaintiffs,
George N. Anderson, called by the plaintiff on direct
examination, was incompetent to testify as to any statement by, or transaction with, such deceased, or matter
of fact whatever, which must have been equally within
the knowledge of both the witness and such deceased
person, by reason of the provisions of said ''dead man's
statute.''
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SIXTH: In it holding that one of the plaintiffs,
Lorenzo

,r.

Anderson, Jr .. ealled by the plaintiff on

direct exan1ination,
any

~taten1ent by.

"·a~

incompetent to testify as to

or transaction with, such deceased,

or matter of fact whatever, which 1nust have been equally
within the kowledge of both the witness and such deceased person, by reason of the provisions of the said
"'dead 1nan 's statute."

ARGUMENT
Point 1. The so called ''dead an's statute'' does not
apply to n1ake incompetent any of the parties to this
cause because neither of the parties are sueing or defending as heirs or administrators; neither are either
of them defending as the assignee or grantee of any heir
or devisee of the deceased. And furthrmore, the basis
upon which the Court sustained counsel's objection has
long since been abolished under our statutes by deleting
the provision preventing a grantee of a deceased person
to testify. The original "dead man's statute" simply
prevented the testimony of a person as to transactions
with a deceased person, ''where the matter of fact
must have been equally within the knowledge of both the
witnesses and the deceased.'' As stated by Justice Wolfe
in Burnham vs. Eschler, 208 P. 2d 96.
"The plaintiff's husband was entirely competent to testify as to statements made by the
plaintiff's deceased mother to the effect that
certain bank deposits belong to the plaintiff.''
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It appears to me, at the outset that the decision of this Court in Maxfield v. Sainr;bury, 172
P. 2d 122 was written for the express purpose
of guiding future litigation involving the dead
man's statute. Chief Justice Larsen states: "It
was never intended that this section should be
used for the purpose of suppressing the truth.
On the contrary, the statute's sole purpose is to
prevent the proving by false testimony of claims
against the estate of a deceased person.''
Again by Justice Wolfe : ''On the one side
is a person who is seeking to protect the integrity of the estate or to recover assets claimed
to belong to it; on the other side is a person who
seeks to subtract from the estate or resisting recovery of claimed assets. The statute is for the
benefit of the first side and operates against the
opposing party''.
In the case at bar there is no estate. Both sides contend that one of the two sets of deeds are valid. If both
sets are void for one reason or another then we have the
peculiar situation where both parties are trying to protect the estate by adding to the assets, and no assault
is being made on the estate, and therefore, the statute
cannot apply.
The Utah case of Mower v. Mower, 228 P. 911 held
that grantees in a deed who were also heirs of the deceased did not disqualify them as witnesses as to the
delivery of the deeds in· question. This cases is squarely
in point. And this decision and holding was followed in
Brown v. Skeen, 58 P. 2d 24. The Court said: (approving
the Mower case)
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'• The question aro:-;e n~ to whether or not
eertain of the children of a deceased who were
heir~ were di~qualified under the statute fron1
testifying to having seen a deed in possession of
their n1other. grantee of their father. In that
case the court held that even though it were assunled that the children had an interest in the
event of the suit by reason of the fact that they
were heirs of the deceased, that interest was with
the plaintiff and not with the defendant, so that
the adverse party, their mother, was not defending as administrator, heir, or legatee or devisee
of the deceased, but was defending in her own
right as grantee under the deed, so that the express terms of the statute did not exclude those
children from being witnesses as to the possession of the deed''.
The lower Court even prevented the husband of the
defendant, J[arie T .•Johnson fron1 testfying as well
as the wives of George and Ren Anderson. ( tr. 158~
159, 100, and 206)
The following ruling of the Court is typical and
shows clearly how the Court unduly restricted the proof
of the plaintiff's case in the following words at page
206 when the Court was speaking to an adverse witness, Marie T. Johnson.
''I don't want you to tell the jury anything
your father said concerning the 1943 deeds nor
do I want you to tell the jury any transaction you
had with your father."
The whole record shows the manner in which the
"dead u1an 'f' statute" was used to establish the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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livery of the '49 deeds which were favorable to the respondents and to prevent the establishment of the '43
deeds.
This is clearly brought out in the testimony of Marie
Johnson (tr. 320, 321) where she says "The 1949 deed
he gave us'' and on page 321, she states ''In 1949 he
gave us the deed and told us to keep it."
These deeds, of course, are the ones that the respondents were trying to establish and naturally there
would have been no objection from their counsel.
Justice Wade, in the concurring opinion in the
Burnham case (Supra) said in speaking of the testimony
of the husband:
"Under those circumstances, the temptation
not to tell the truth is often beyond the capacity
of some people to resist.''
We have the reverse in this case where we call the
adverse party and the only possible objection that could
be made to their testimony whether they were competent
or not was made in order to exclude the truth from the
record. That is the reason why our statute provides an
exception when called by the adverse party.
In Staats vs. Staats, 226 P. 677 the Utah Court said:
said:
''This is not an assault upon the estate of the
deceased, but is purely a controversy between the.
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children who, a~ a matter of course, are heirs
of the deceased and in this instance also his devisees, and the defendant who is the widow of
the deceased and who refuses to abide by the
provisions n1ade for her in her husband's will."

That case discussed the 1natter of whether the widow
who renounced the will wa~ talking as an heir or in
her own right and the Court said:
'·Indeed that can be the only basis of her
claim since she refused to take under her husband's will but elected to insist upon her statutary interest of 1/3. In view, therefore, that
she claimed her share of the estate in her own
right, the other heirs are competent witnesses."
That statute has no application where the controversy arises between or among heirs and merely involves
questions relating to their respective rights as such and
where there is no assault upon the estate.
In our case, there is certainly no assault upon the
estate as no estate exists. It is merely a controversy between the parties as grantees to deeds.
If all of the deeds had been held void for one
reason or another, it would be creating an estate rather
than making an assault upon an estate so that we contend that all of the witnesses are competent to testify.
Points 2, 5 and 6. These points are treated together because they involve the plaintiffs. In Miller
vs. Livingston, by the Utah Supreme Court in 88 P.
338 Mr. Justice Straup stated that the statute in this
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regard is intended to protect states and relates to proceedings wherein the decision sought hy the party so
testifying would tend to reduce or irnpair the estate and
does not relate to the relative rights of the heirs or
devisees as to the distribution of an estate in a proceeding by which the estate itself is not in either event
to be reduced or impaired.
Points 3 and 4.

Under the rulings of the lower

Court, it should be apparent that the Court entirely rnisconstrued the meaning of the "dead man's statute."
Rule 43 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure make the
right of cross examination of a witness as broad as possible and in part states as follows:
''A party may call an adverse party'' etc.
It is interesting to note at this point that the words
''adverse party'' are exactly the same in the ''dead
man's statute" as contained in the rules which goes
on to say that "Such witnesses thus called may be contradicited and impeached by, or on behalf, of the adverse
party." The word "adverse party" is used in its ordinary means, according to Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, ''acting against, opposed, opposite.''
Certainly the adverse party in this case as far as
the plaintiffs are concerned, are the defendants and the
adverse parties so far as the defendants are concerned,
are the plaintiffs.
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The objedion presented by counsel for the defendant~

( tr. 105) is enlightening where Th1r. Young objects

upon the grounds that they are defending the validity
of the 1~)-!9 deeds, and therefore, contend to be defending as grantees. but as to the 1943 deeds, he seems to contend that they are heirs. The Court seemed to take Mr.
Young's view of the matter because at page 107 the
Court said:
"If (the objection) is raised as an heir, it
should be sustained. And a logical following
through under Mr. Young's theory of the case
as stated in the record, I should, as to the 1943
deeds, sustain the objection."
This ruling was sustained throughout the case without any thought given to the fact that the defendants
were called by the plaintiff, the plaintiff being the adverse party to the witness called. The calling of these
witnesses by plaintiffs and appellants certainly waived
the statute, but as I recall, the oral arguments before the
Court, :Mr. Young claimed that he was entitled to defend
against the 1943 deeds as heirs, and therefore the statute
applied, and to uphold the 1949 deeds as grantees, and
therefore the statute did not apply ( tr. 105)
An Annotation carried in 159 ALR 416 follows two
other earlier Annotations cited therein, and which states
the rule to be :
''The general rule stated in the earlier Annotations that subject certain qualifications, the
cross e:xamination of a witness concerning transSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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actions or conversations with a deceased party,
amounts to a waiver of the incompetency of the
witnesses with respect to such matters and renders him incompetent to testify thereto as against
the examining party.''
It should not be necessary to cite further authorities,
but I want to earnestly state to the Court that I have
searched diligently for authorities holding to the con-

trary, and have found none, and I hope that counsel for
the adverse party will correct me if there are such
opposite cases.
The only possible reason that counsel would object
to his clients testifying would be to prevent their testimony concerning the 1943 deeds. Let us assume that
they would tell the truth concerning the transactions
with the deceased. If the truth was that the deeds
were never delivered, then the testimony certainly would
not have been damaging to him. This Court has said
many times that the purpose of the statute was to prevent the tendency of witnesses to favor their own theory
of the case. The purpose of the statute is certainly ;not
to prevent the Court and Jury from hearing the truth.
If the manner of handling the two sets of deeds by the
deceased Anderson was the san1e in 1943 as it was in
1949, then all parties to this case must admit that the
1943 deeds were valid. This is so because Marie testified ( tr. 322) that all of the deeds of '43 were held in
the saine place and she further testified that Ren told
her to file the 1943 deeds and she asked someone else
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1;)
about filing then1 and they told her not to, but she didnot reineinber who that wat', and that ''as long as Dad
wa~

aliYe ( tr. 3:23) not to file then1."

She apparently

believed therefore, that t'he had a right to file the '43
deeds t'O that it appeart' that the '43 deeds were delivered but not filed.
K ow in the
appellants were
these were not
but respondents

case of the 1949 deeds, so far as the
concerned, these deeds were still held;
physically delivered to the appellants
claim that these deeds are valid.

If, therefore, both deeds were treated in the same
manner by the deceased, then the first deeds, in point
of time, are valid and respondents were both persons
who had this knowledge and should have been permitted to testify to both transactions.
The continual objections and the sustaining of these
objections had such an effect upon Marie's testimony
( tr. 215) that she seemed to believe that the transactions of '43 were similar because once when Ren was
there on a visit, she got the '43 deeds and showed then1
to Ren. She testified that she thought that they were
gotten from their Dad's desk. She was asked if she
then thought that her Father had fixed up his property
by execution of the 1943 deeds and she said she could not
remember. She was asked if she thought her Father
had fixed up the property and she answered, "I'm trying to figure out-well, I don't know how to answer
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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without implicating Dad in it.''
Her further answer on page 215 is indeed revealing
where she answered as follows:
''Well, Dad, all his life had 1nade deeds.

As I

stated yesterday, he made deeds continously and each
deed was supposed to be ''the'' deed-what should I
say~

I don't know how to word it."

It should be plain that had Marie been permitted to
testify to the transactions with the deceased, that some
revealing testimony would have gone to the jury. But
of course her testimony was excluded under the provision of the ''dead man's statute.''
The rule applicable is well stated 1n 58 Am. Jur.
210:

"The law recognizes that it may sometimes
be to the advantage of the person for whose benefit the statute prohibiting a witness from testifying concerning transactions or statements of
deceased persons, and conductive to the ends of
justice, to permit the disqualified witness to testify; and to this end a person for whose benefit
the statute exists may exercise discretion in making an incompetent witness competent.''
Again at page 212 : ''The general rule is,
subject to certain qualifications, that the crossexamination of a witness concerning transactions
or conversations with a deceased party, concerning which the witness did not testify to on the
direct examination, amounts to a waiver of the
incompetency of the witness with respect to such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rnatters, and renders him incompetent to testify
as against the examining party."
It should be obvious that as appellants, they are the
protected and adYerse parties, and can waive the ineompetency; and appellant only can waive; that as to
re~pondents they are the protected parties against incmnpetent witnesses of the adverse parties in the suit,
and only they can waive.
~Iarie

was permitted to testify that in 1949 (tr.
125) her dad n1ade a deed to respondents, and was by
him instructed to destroy the 1943 deeds (Tr. 126). She
kept here deed, and recorded it the day before her
Father died, but never did deliver Ren's 1949 deed to
him, and it was never tendered until during the Court
proceedings (Tr. 126).
Equally frank testimony concerning transactions involving the 1943 deeds would have undoubtedly changed
the outcome of the case. The Court ruled (Tr. 206)
1\{arie testifying: ''I'm going to sustain your objection
(respondent's) insofar as any alleged statement of the
deceased is concerned. I just want the witness to understand it . . . the witness is directed not to give us any
statements of her father concerning any 1943 transaction
or to relate any transactions with her father, but outside of that go ahead.'' This ruling was apparently
on the erroneous theory of opposing counsel as follows :
(Tr. 118) "If they're (referring to Marie Johnson)
called on behalf of the party who is defendant, the party
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defending may waive the statute, but not the party
who is seeking to establish the evidencc
That's my
understanding of the statute.''
3

•

There can be no douht but that, aside frmn keeping
evidence of the 1943 transactions from the jury, the
rulings of the Court had an influence on the jury because of the instruction of the Court to the jury: ( Tr.
119) ''So the jury will understand what we're doing,
at this tixne, unless the court changes its mind the objections are sustained as to the 1943 deeds, and the theory
being, gentlemen, that any transactions had with the
deceased Lorenzo Anderson cannot be testified to by any
of these people here. As to the 1949 deed, there may
be a different ruling as we go along.'' Such an instruction cannot help but influence the deliberations of a
jury for a lapnan would naturally feel that by judicial
ruling the 1943 deeds were a nullit:v, and this would
leave them nothing to do by find that the 1949 deed::;
were delivered. And that is exactly happened.
I find one positive statement that a grantee is not
protected by the statute:
''A grantee is not protected under a statute
protecting executors, administrators, heirs, legatees, or devisees of any deceased person, where
the GRANTEE IS DEFENDING AS SUCH,
AND NOT AS HEIR OR DEVISEE". (Caps
mine) 58 Am. Jur. 201". (Note: the Annotation
cited in support of this must contain a mis-print,
for 122 ALR 255 is on another subject. However,
I do find an Annotation in 66 ALR 1041 where
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lD
the eases are split as to whether a grantee or
assignee or decedent can be construed as a representative of decendent. But, all of the cases
cited are old and only deal with statutes using
the word "representative and decedent". Our
statute specifically omits any mention of a representative of decedent.
To recapitulate all points: (1) All parties are
grantees of deceased and as such a r e therefore
competent witnesses; (2) defendants and -respondents
are not defending as heirs, but as grantees, and
are competent witnesses; (3) defendants and respondents
were called to testify by the adverse party and if otherwise incmnpetent, the objection was waived by plaintiffs
and appellants; ( 4) the exclusion of the testimony of
each of the parties as to transactions with deceased
was prejudicial error, and each exclusion sufficient to·
grant a new trial; ( 5) the repeated rulings of the Court
as to the exclusion of evidence relating to the 1943 deeds
was misleading to the jury and prejudiced their deliberations against appellants.

Respectfully submitted,
PRESTON & HARRIS
Attorneys for appellants
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